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Abstract 
The principles on which all the operation of the huge informing through the 
image and the world machine’s operation are based are easily made evident. 
Its logic is that of what has no need to make sense, and the principles on which 
it is based are three: 1) the gross information has an immediate available 
sense for everybody; 2) what is important is present and even more, 
immediacy; and 3) information leads. The race of being the first in breaking 
the news is a sign of the unhealthy relationship we have with information. The 
moment breaks up in a cloud of information where everything is mixed 
without rhyme or reason. In this article, teacher Monserrat studies some of the 
aspects of the media, going into the limits of the rhetoric and political 
philosophy and using classical sources from authors like Socrates, Plato or 
Isocrates. 
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1. The world as an insignificant spectacle: The domain of rhetoric 
In a book intentionally written to be controversial, French professor Philippe 
Bénéton teaches us the effects of what he calls “equality by default”. “Equality by 
default” is the name he has given to the principle that characterises our 
advanced societies, which have decided to follow a downward levelling of 
everything that constitutes the actual reality of things. A priori, there is no need 
for them to be equal, but furthermore should they be equal, there is no need for 
them to be levelled downward. According to Bénéton’s analysis, it turns out that 
the triumph of human rights comes paradoxically at the price of a methodical 
hollowing out of their substantial content. The processes of radicalisation of the 
                                                 
1 An initial version of this text was delivered on the 21st of March 2002 in the series “Politics and 
Communication, at the Limit” at the Institut d’Estudis Polítics Blanquerna. Its reformulation is 
part of the research project 2009SGR447 “EIDOS: Hermenèutica, platonisme i modernitat”. 
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claim for rights and the victory of individual autonomy ultimately result in the 
dispossession of the being, rendering it subjected to intensive watchfulness. As 
one of our newspaper commentators said recently, former extremist left-wing 
youths have ended up placing video surveillance on public thoroughfares when 
they had to exercise the responsibilities of governing. Our commentator found 
this to be an example of the paradoxical evolution typically found between 
youthful idealistic fervour and the harsh reality that these youths’ conservative 
principles impose in adulthood. Our critical commentator is toying with our 
political leaders of today who were the young progressives of yesterday. It does 
not surprise me that a young defender of revolution ends up installing video 
surveillance on the street; it seems utterly coherent to me and is clear proof that 
the fundamental principles of their conception of society remain inalterable: 
some people are good and some are bad; therefore, “measures must be taken”.2 
For now, however, let us leave this public thoroughfare subjected to the 
surveillance of the authority, or to the vigilant eye of the police, and let us turn 
to the effects that Philippe Bénéton attributes to the action of “equality by 
default” in the mass media. To Bénéton, the principles underlying the entire 
functioning of the gigantic news machine that provides news via images and 
words are easily manifest. Their implicit epistemology harbours no mystery. 
Their logic is the logic of what does not need to make sense, and the three 
principles upon which it rests are: 1. Raw information has an immediately 
accessible meaning to everyone. 2. What matters is the current, and even more 
the immediate. 3. The image rules. The examples he cites are trivial, yet 
nonetheless effective. Bénéton cites televised news shows, the news on the 
economy that appears on them, the Dow Jones Index, for example. I quote his 
description:  
 
“Yesterday afternoon, the Dow Jones Index dropped four points 
or rose three. I’m not sure which one and it actually doesn’t matter. 
What matters more is that ritually, in France, in the United States, in 
Germany and elsewhere, the anchor of the evening news believes that it 
is his duty to provide this figure. What exactly does this index reflect? Is 
a variation of a few points significant? How can it be explained? What 
should we expect from it? In short, what is the meaning of this 
information? I confess my ignorance, and I imagine that I’m in good 
company. It is further doubtful whether the person speaking knows 
much more. That is, the information probably has very little meaning 
for both the person providing it and the person receiving it. And yet, 
judging by his expression when he is speaking, this is serious business. 
Look at him, the anchor, staring at the teleprompter where his text is 
scrolling down, and his articulation is perfect. He is a ‘professional’: he 
is not quite sure what he’s saying, but he says it very well.” (Bénéton, 
2001:141). 
  
The subject of the news is usually raw. By this I do not mean that it 
should not be somehow processed in order to be “communicable”, or that it 
                                                 
2 For a very accurate perspective, see Koselleck (1959). 
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should not correspond to the “facts” as they happen, but that precisely because 
of the very need for them to be communicable in a mass medium, they must 
adopt and take the form – even if it is not what they are – of a raw fact, a datum, 
an event, a case, a decontextualised proposition, that is, the form that is 
idealised in the “headline”. By the same token, what matters is the current, and 
even better, the immediate. Knowing is tantamount to immediately knowing 
what is happening, and the less distanced we are from the news the better. The 
race to be the first to report on the news, to tell the results of the elections right 
at an exit poll, is a sign of the unhealthy relationship we have with the news. The 
instant is shattered into a maelstrom of bits where everything is jumbled with 
no order or harmony, with no time to digest or even to find the nuance of the 
differences. The ephemeral and the fleeting are the lords that govern the 
economy of news broadcasts. The image rules. Wherever there is an image, 
everything must stop, even if it is a thoroughly insipid image, because the 
primary image which we are discussing does not reach the heart of things, does 
not discern, does not read. The primary image we are discussing reveals nothing 
unknown, hidden or profound. It is the surface of things, their appearance. Yet 
everything shown has been chosen. Using what criteria? The news machine 
saves itself from providing us with the selection criteria: what it explicitly states 
is that these criteria correspond to what our interest should be. However, what 
is implicit is a bit more complicated. On the one hand are the rules of the 
instrumental logic of the news machine: more information, more quickly, with 
more images and more spectacle; on the other hand is the law that expresses the 
spirit of the times: the preference for the epic of the physical man. The news 
machine prioritises the economy, sports, physical health, sexuality, in short, the 
wellbeing of the body. What profit does this yield in terms of knowledge? Who 
remembers what the important news was fifteen days ago, two months ago, one 
year ago? Bénéton’s analysis continues with this implacable critical logic, but we 
have to leave it now because it would not take us where we want to go. However, 
before explaining that, we must take yet another small detour. 
 We shall now cite a text by a slightly earlier author:  
 
“So the orator (rétor) does not teach (didaskalikós) what justice or 
injustice is before the tribunals and other groups of people (okhlón); the 
only thing he does is convince (peistikós). Naturally, he could not teach 
such important things (megálaprágmata) to such a huge mass of people 
(dépouokhlón) in such a short time (en olígokhróno).” (Plato: Gorgias, 
455a). 
  
This excerpt from Plato comes from a passage in which the character of 
Socrates is speaking in the dialogue entitled Gorgias. In the excerpt cited, 
rhetoric constructs persuasion. In this he concurs with Isocrates, who believed 
that the benefits of rhetoric derive from the mastery and subjugation of force via 
the word. The rhetoric of both Isocrates and Gorgias rightly celebrates the 
triumph of the word over force:  
 
“As it is natural for us to convince each other and to demonstrate 
what we are deliberating on, not only must we distance ourselves from 
82     CSSR, 2 (2012)  Josep Monserrat-Molas 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
the savage life, but we must then gather together, populate cities, 
establish laws, discover techniques; the word has helped using almost 
everything that we have invented.” (Isocrates: Nicocles III, 6). 
  
However, this celebration of the word over force aims to occupy the 
entire space of political life. What would obligate us to act on the Socratic 
question is precisely an effort to counter this desire to occupy the totality of the 
dimension of human reflection and actions. Professor Jordi Sales has used the 
term “doxosophies” to refer to the knowledge that after having achieved a 
successful sphere of effectiveness, attempts to occupy the entire space of 
political life and become the critical instance or tribunal from which everything 
is judged. Socrates questioned this aim in every case – although now we are only 
concerned with rhetoric – and thus managed simultaneously to first reveal the 
limitation of this doxosophy and its subordination to another instance that 
judges, a critical instance which would yield philosophy, and secondly prompt 
an unintended effect, namely the antagonism of theorator and his brethren 
since he uncovers the weakness and error in their pretension for everything. 
Gorgias defines rhetoric as that which builds persuasion (demiurgospeithous 
[Plato: Gorgias, 453a]). What kind of persuasion? Socrates asks. Accepting that 
it is a given kind of persuasion leads to Gorgias’ subsequent refutation because 
he has already accepted the relativisation of the power of rhetoric along with its 
absolutisation. Rhetorical persuasion is specified with the purpose of what is 
just and what is unjust (Plato: Gorgias, 454b), and as a belief (pístis) instead of 
a teaching (mathesis) (Plato: Gorgias, 454d). From the latter derives the fact 
that two forms of persuasion are established: with and without teaching 
(mathesis) or knowledge (episteme). Rhetoric produces a persuasion that leads 
one to believe but that does not teach about what is just and what is unjust 
(Plato: Gorgias, 454e-455a). The orator does not teach (didaskalein); rather he 
leads one to believe (epistein). Socrates granted that the orator “could not, 
naturally, teach such important things to such as huge mass of people in such a 
short time”. Therefore, he must be satisfied with convincing, persuading as 
belief without teaching. In this brief excerpt, the model of life grounded upon 
rhetoric presents three essential features, which, following Jordi Sales, we shall 
refer to using the following neologisms: a) the okhlogenetic factor; b) the 
oligochronic factor; and c) the megalopragmatic factor (Sales, 1992:124-127). 
 
a) The okhlogenetic factor: Rhetorical power cannot teach such 
important things to so many people (okhlón) in such a short time, but it 
can convince them. The persuasive function of rhetoric precisely achieves 
its efficacy in situations where there are many people. Rhetoric is 
possible and makes power possible in that it engenders mass. Sovereign 
rhetoric is what engenders the multitude or mass. Literally speaking, a 
“mass” (okhlón) is the mixture that stems from adding a liquid to a 
powder, yielding a solid, even pasty, substance. Therefore, pulverisation 
and the addition of a liquid are needed to create a new unit, the 
homogenous public that depends upon the word of the rhetorician. In his 
movement through the scene, it is clear that Socrates is not a part of the 
crowd that rhetoric creates and needs; rather his integration emerges as a 
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question of the conditions that enable and result from the massive action 
of civilised rhetoric. 
b) The oligochronic factor: Rhetorical power has too little time 
(oligokhronos) to be able to teach a multitude such grand affairs, but in 
little time it can indeed convince. The reason is simple: it has little time 
because there are many people and what must be explained is too large. 
However, if we examine it more thoroughly it is not so simple: the orators 
and experts in the tribunals produce persuasion; they do not teach. 
However, they do manage to get the audience to say what they want them 
to say. The orator is the slave of the clock because the time to convince, 
the time he has to assemble the words to convince about great things is a 
scarce commodity, one that is vied for by more than one aspirant and 
which must be managed with the economy of maximal efficacy and 
celerity of information compared to his competitors. The monopoly on 
information is not characterised by the celerity of his information. “The 
free man always has the time to converse. (...) The orator is always 
speaking against the clock, urged on by the clock (...) because the 
adversary is above him ready to remind him of the points to which he 
must limit himself” (Plato: Theaetetus, 172d). There is little time, but 
persuasion, not teaching, takes place, because the act of educating that 
would disband the crowd and resize the truly attainable affairs via active, 
free conduits requires dimensions of the vita activa which have been 
violated by the efficacy of rhetorical action. The Socratic proposition is 
smaller, slower and targeted primarily at the individual conscience. 
Compared to rhetoric, which deals with large affairs in little time for 
many people, Socratic philosophy tends to lose in the game of 
appearances and short-term political expediencies. 
c) The megalopragmatic factor: The efficacy of Gorgian rhetoric is 
measured in the text with examples given by Gorgias himself on the way 
that the truly grand things (megálaprágmata) in the city have been 
achieved, such as the fortifications and walls. They are due to the merit of 
the rhetoricians, because the rhetoricians, not the doctors, for example, 
are the ones capable of convincing the ill person to take his medicine or 
let himself undergo surgery; if he wanted, the orator would even be able 
to get himself chosen as the doctor before the assembly (Plato: Gorgias, 
456b). The capacity of rhetoric to fight against the multitude, to fight 
with the multitude, is so unique and superior to the specific technical 
skills that come before it that it is capable of overcoming the initially 
feasible dimensions. The socialised word subordinates and mutes the 
right word inits apparent inefficacy, which is weak before the whims of 
the ill person or before the passion of the crowd. This possibility of 
silencing those who only know about the specific particular compared to 
the whims of the many is the movement that enables the throngs to 
gather and be convinced of things that can become truly large, thanks to 
the number and the capacity of the multitude or mass. 
 
 Who would be capable of standing up to the force of the multitude which 
constitutes political power? Who has no fear of its force? Who does not concede 
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and bow to their opinions? And even worse, who would be capable of raising 
their voice amidst such noise? 
 
2. A possible adaptation of the discourse that seeks the truth. 
Persecution and the Art of Writing. The indispensable memory of 
the difficulty of seeking the truth. Reticent writing 
The question of the effects of the influence of philosophical questioning 
becomes particularly dramatic in relation to the legal system of the city. Let us 
recall the case of Socrates, who was accused, judged, sentenced, executed and 
later rehabilitated, by democratic Athens (Luri Medrano, 1998; Strauss, 1989). 
Philosophy has often been aware of this founding circumstance, and we should 
listen to what the philosophers have said about this awareness. However, much 
later, especially the movement that has been called the Enlightenment tried to 
demonstrate that in addition to undermining and diminishing the fundamental 
beliefs and institutions of democracy, the quest for knowledge and its popular 
dissemination supply the only solid basis for a given kind of free governance. 
Leo Strauss was persuaded by Nietzsche, Heidegger and Carl Schmitt’s critiques 
of “modern rationalism”, devastating critiques of the liberal political philosophy. 
These critiques blamed the spiritual decline of the West on the liberal and 
democratic principles that had ultimately triumphed after a longer or shorter 
gestation. The depth and rigour of Strauss’ analysis, however, led him to 
transcend these anti-liberal and anti-democratic struggles that were shaking up 
Europe and to reconsider the appropriateness and the status of modern 
philosophical criticism in light of its ancient counterpart. Strauss reopened the 
grievance among ancients and moderns alike in the quest for an ancient 
liberalism that could be associated with the entity that became its refuge: 
philosophy. Strauss avoided the perils of Nietzsche, Schmitt and Heidegger, 
giving an even more profoundly conservative response to their conservative 
criticisms of tradition, and since he was even more profoundly conservative he 
was even more radical. Back in his earliest philosophical formulations, Strauss 
stated the following: we have fallen into a second cave because of our polemic 
against tradition: this is why we need a history of philosophy to mend the cave 
– from the second to the first cave or natural situation (Strauss, 1934:13). The 
“discovery of nature” is Strauss’ attempt to achieve a source of inquiry for 
human actions that is not reduced to the will, arbitrariness or subjectivity of 
modernity, and that can sustain the comparison with the Torah or traditional 
Jewish law. However, Strauss, following Lucretius, always prompts thoughts of 
De rerumnatura, the poem of uprootedness, of recognition of the despairing 
nature of the truth, as well as the reluctance to reveal this unredeemable 
absence of divinity or meaning or order in the world outside philosophical 
circles.  
 
“The recognition of this truth, of this fundamental exile, 
according to which man lacks roots or the possibility of regret and 
reintegration into the community of faith that Maimonides had 
defended, of which religion specifically consists, is the result of 
philosophy”. (Lastra, 2000:231) 
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If not Strauss’ main contribution, at least his most famous one is the 
revival of a forgotten way of interpreting and understanding the relationship 
among philosophy, politics and communication. In Persecution and the Art of 
Writing, he outlines the principles of his hermeneutics, which earn him 
contradictory praise from H.G. Gadamer.3 Strauss gave a working plan that he 
prepared at the beginning of his sojourn in the United States this tentative title: 
Philosophy and the Law: Historical Essays. The title was the translation of a 
work of his published in Germany in 1935, Philosophie und Gesetz, but with the 
contents changed and expanded.4 Among the contents there is an essay entitled 
“Persecution and the Art of Writing”, and he notes the planned outline of the 
subject: “What we can observe in the totalitarian societies of our day – that is, 
societies which eliminate the freedom of speech via a manifest policy – provides 
us with important guidelines for understanding the conditions under which 
numerous free spirits of centuries past have thought, expressed themselves and 
written. This subject will be dealt with in: (X) ‘Persecution and the Art of 
Writing’ (already published in Social Research, 8 [1941]). / I will include in this 
essay the observations on the controversy over the writings of Maimonides in 
the early 13th century. / In essay X, I should mention the question of knowledge 
as the emergence of the modern liberal society, which is characterised by 
recognition of every person’s right to freedom of speech and has radically 
changed the condition of the literary production of heterodox or not entirely 
orthodox thinkers. It would seem desirable to discuss one example taken from 
the transitional period, from the period during which both ways of seeing 
freedom of speech, the old way and the modern or liberal way, were still at odds 
with one another. The most interesting example in today’s context would be the 
controversy between Moses Mendelssohn and F.H. Jacobi over the Spinozism of 
Lessing. While preparing the edition of Mendelssohn’s metaphysical writings for 
the edició de jubileu, I discovered unknown documents which shed new light on 
this controversy. A discussion of this controversy would enable me to examine 
Spinoza’s philosophy in its relationship with mediaeval Jewish philosophy.” 
 Leo Strauss never wrote this book; instead, in 1952 he published a book 
that revisited some of these contents with the title of the essay we are 
discussing. In the study of certain thinkers from the past (Maimonides, Halevi, 
Spinoza and others) Leo Strauss discovered a following way of envisioning the 
relations between the quest for truth and society: philosophy and science, as the 
supreme expressions of man’s activity, consist of an attempt to replace a simple 
opinion about things with knowledge of this “whole”. Despite this, the world of 
opinion is the element in which society develops; hence philosophy and science 
themselves entail an attempt to dissolve the element in which society develops. 
Thus it follows that philosophy and science should be limited to a minority, and 
that philosophers and scientists should respect the opinions upon which society 
is grounded. This limitation to a minority stems from the very difficulty of the 
                                                 
3 H.G. Gadamer dedicated controversial pages of his famous work starting in the second edition 
to L. Strauss (Gadamer, 1989:493ss). Upon the publication of the first edition, both authors 
engaged in correspondence that continued the acquaintance they had made back in Germany 
when they were still students. The epistolary relationship has been published (Gadamer and 
Strauss, 1978:5-11).  
4 This project (“Plan of a book tentatively entitled Philosophy and the Law: Historical Essays”), 
which comes from the Strauss archives conserved in the library of the University of Chicago, was 
published by K.H. Green (1997:467-470).  
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matter, while respect for opinion stems from the difficulty or impossibility of 
exchanging it for knowledge. These authors developed a particular expository 
method which enabled them to reveal what they considered the truth to a few 
without endangering the majority’s unconditional acceptance of opinions. They 
would clearly differentiate between a truthful, esoteric doctrine and a socially 
useful, exoteric one. The crucial premise of this argument is the position which 
asserts that the world of opinion is the element in which society develops. And 
the idea that Strauss set forth has two implicit notions. One of them is 
historical: knowing whether there were ever great thinkers who held the view on 
the relations between philosophy and society as we have described them now 
and used it to guide their communicative activity; and a philosophical one: 
knowing whether this point of view is completely false, completely true or 
conditionally true (for example, “the world of opinion is the element on which 
non-liberal societies are developed”. 
 In the brief compendium in which Al-Farabi synthesises Plato’s Laws, 
there is a story in the prologue to illustrate a general principle (Al-Farabi, 1952). 
This principle says that learned men, when behaving repeatedly in a certain 
way, induce people to falsely believe that they will always behave in the same 
way. The story goes as follows. Once upon a time there lived a pious ascetic, a 
man who lived in isolation and abstinence in his love of mortification and 
humiliation, who habitually and consciously preferred pain over pleasure. He 
was known for being a man of probity, self-mastery, abstinence and devotion to 
the gods. Despite all this, or perhaps precisely because of it, he attracted the ire 
of the tyrant of the city. Overcome by fear of the tyrant, he wanted to flee, but 
the tyrant ordered him imprisoned, and to ensure that he could not escape, he 
ordered that all the guards keep careful watch over the city gates. The pious 
ascetic managed to get appropriate clothing for his purposes and donned it, 
although the story does not explain how he got it. He also got some cymbals, 
and faking drunkenness while singing along with the clashing of the cymbals he 
drew near one of the city gates at sundown. When the guard said, “Who goes 
there?” he answered jokingly: “I am the pious ascetic you’re looking for”. The 
guard thought that the man was teasing and let him pass. The pious ascetic thus 
managed to save himself without ever having told a lie (Strauss, 1988:135ss). 
 To Gadamer, Strauss’ indications are “largely obvious on the surface”, but 
not so obviously deep-down, which would prevent any certainty in their 
interpretation:  
 
“Are not conscious displacement, masking and concealment of 
one’s own opinion actually the extreme and rare case of a much more 
frequent situation, and even of the usual, common situation? 
Persecution (by superiors, the Church, the Inquisition, etc.) is nothing 
other than an extreme case compared to the deliberate pressure exerted 
or not by society and advertising on human thinking.” (Gadamer, 1989)5  
 
                                                 
5 This is an opinion also shared in a wonderful article introducing the hermeneutics of Leo 
Strauss by Professor J. Blanco Echauri (1996:89-108). 
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Strauss’ position is radical: it expands to the entire history of philosophy 
(always truly opposed by religious or political power) against the ingenuous 
enlightened thesis of saying everything and explaining everything. And both 
persecution and the quest for a reader who could be a potential disciple come 
into play in this concealment. Gadamer refuses to accept this because it is 
extremely difficult to find criteria that unequivocally establish this 
dissimulation:  
 
“I do not see very clearly that when contradictory propositions 
are found in an author, the concealed and occasional ones should be 
taken as the expression of their real opinion (...). Contradictory points 
are indeed a prime criterion for truth, but unfortunately they are not an 
unequivocal criterion for hermeneutic thinking. (...). It seems totally 
certain to me that this sentence of Strauss’, so enlightening at first, 
cannot be applied to the so-called Platonic errors in Socrates’ 
argumentation, the sentence that when an author shows contradictions 
that any schoolchild today could easily identify, then we should suppose 
that not only are they deliberate but they are meant to be discovered.” 
(Gadamer, 1989). 
  
Leo Strauss responds to this criticism of the weakness of his premises 
with by supplying proof, such as this:  
 
“If a society bans its writers from freely discussing the principles 
upon which it is grounded, we are legitimated to pose the question of 
whether a writer who belongs to such a society and stands up in defence 
of his principles is defending those principles because he is convinced of 
their validity or because he is giving way to a superior force. The 
question becomes even more acute if it is a writer of great intelligence 
who explicitly says that it is not wrong to teach doctrines that people 
know are erroneous. And even more important is the problem of 
whether his writings are full of enigmatic details that would easily be 
imperceptible if someone does not pay enough attention to them” 
(Strauss, 1959:224).  
 
The influence of persecution on literature consists precisely of the fact 
that it requires all writers who hold heterodox points of view to develop a 
peculiar writing technique. However, what kind of writing can be protected 
from persecution and yet serve as philosophical communication? How is this 
feat possible at the limits of communication? 
 “Everyone whose thinking does not follow equine logic or, in other words, 
everyone capable of independent, honest thinking, cannot condescend to accept 
the points of view sponsored by the government. Persecution cannot prevent 
independent thought,” said Leo Strauss (Strauss, 1952:23). When he speaks 
about “equine logic”, he is referring to Parmenidean logic, and especially to the 
logic that characteristics the inhabitants of the country of the Houyhnhnms 
according to the narrator of Gulliver’s Travels. In equine logic, it is impossible 
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to say “what is not” because lies have no place in their world. Gulliver recounts 
that the horses “do not have a word in their language that means lie or 
falsehood”.6Absolute frankness is not a characteristic of human creatures. For 
this reason, we must write and read “between the lines”.  
 
“This literature is not meant for all readers, but only for faithful 
and intelligent readers. It has all the advantages of private 
communication without sharing its most important disadvantage – that 
it only reaches the writer’s acquaintances. It has all the advantages of 
public communication without sharing its most important disadvantage 
– capital punishment for the author. However, how can a man work the 
miracle of speaking in a publication for a minority and silencing himself 
for the majority of his readers? What makes this literature possible can 
be expressed through the axiom that unreflective men are careless 
readers, and that only thinking men are careful readers.” (Strauss, 
1952:25).  
“Another axiom that is meaningful, however only as long as 
persecution remains at the limits of legal procedure, is when a careful 
writer of average intelligence is more intelligent than the most 
intelligent censor”. (Strauss, 1952:25-26). 
  
The reassessment of the technical resources of this reticent, elusive or 
esoteric writing is Strauss’ most renowned contribution. Let us recall, for 
example, the latent significance of repetitions, of meaningful silences, of 
important contradictions. The caution that the writer imposes on himself must 
also be imposed on the interpreter in order not to assume more than what is 
insinuated: this method should only be applied in the certainty of a clarification 
more evident than what in historicist texts were nothing other than errors or 
symptoms of decline or weakness. Writing can then become the refuge of 
philosophical communication veiled in a textual tapestry where mirages are 
woven. However, is this description of a situation of persecution valid for our 
times? Strauss tempered his argumentation with the following reflection, which 
would also have the virtue of distracting us from the prejudice which claims that 
by being the latest we are also better than the ones before us, and making our 
situation the general norm: “The attitude that people adopt towards freedom of 
public discussion decisively depends on what they think about popular 
education and its limits. Generally speaking, the pre-modern philosophers were 
less bold on this point than modern philosophers are.” (Strauss, 1952:33). The 
possibility of formulating the distinction between two kinds of esoteric writing, 
that of those who believe that the distance separating the “sages” from the 
“masses” cannot be spanned, and that of those who believe that it can be 
modified by progress in popular education, therefore results from what we think 
about the redemptive value of the scope of education. “Esoteric literature 
assumes that there are basic truths that would not be uttered in public by any 
decent man because they could harm many people who, after being injured, 
would naturally tend to injure the one who uttered the unpleasant truths. In 
                                                 
6J. Swift: Gulliver’s Travels. From another perspective, we have also used Gulliver’s travels in 
the perennial discussion between idealists and realists in politics (Monserrat Molas, 2007). 
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other words, it assumes that the freedom of research and the freedom to publish 
all of the results of research are not guaranteed as basic facts. This literature is 
essentially related to a society which is not liberal.” Strauss continued to set out 
to resolve this issue, but the simplicity of his response is nonetheless surprising. 
Strauss had adopted the esoteric way of writing. He continues the text thus:  
 
“The answer is simple. In Plato’s Symposium, Alcibiades – that 
renowned son of Athens – compares Socrates and his speeches with 
certain sculptures that are truly ugly outside, but that contain the most 
precious images of divine bodies. The works of the great writers of the 
past are lovely even on the outside, yet their visible beauty is manifest 
ugliness compared to the beauty of those hidden treasures which are 
revealed to one only through an arduous, never simple and always 
pleasant endeavour. This always difficult though always pleasant effort 
is, I believe, what philosophers have in mind when they recommend 
education. They feel that education is the only answer to the always 
disturbing question, to the political question par excellence, of how to 
reconcile an order that is not oppression with a freedom that is not 
license.” (Strauss, 1952:37). 
  
The “simplicity” of Strauss’ response is not so simple if we notice that, in 
order to respond to “our” liberal society, Strauss utilises Plato’s device, and if we 
furthermore notice the irony concealed in the even more specific reference to 
Alcibiades. The frankness or outspokenness of Alcibiades and Athens should be 
considered bearing in mind first the tragic reality of the three-fold traitorous 
fate of Alcibiades which came with the defeat of Athens, and secondly the fact 
that Strauss warned that the difficulty in understanding the classics comes from 
the contemporary reader’s exposure to the “brutal and sentimental literature of 
the last five generations”. “We need a second education to accustom our eyes to 
the noble reserve and the tranquil serenity of the classics”. This ethics of 
literature is eminently idealistic and consists of “the preference for recalling the 
good before the bad”.7 Carlo Altini comments on Strauss’ response in this way: 
the problem of esotericism and reticent writing corresponds not only to 
tyrannical and totalitarian societies in which the right to the freedom of 
research and the public dissemination of its results is not guaranteed; rather it 
is also characteristic of liberal societies, especially in response to conformism. 
The recipients of the esoteric philosophical works may still be not philosophers 
but potential young philosophers who must be guided towards the truth through 
popular opinions. The text, or writing, is the philosopher’s act of love towards 
the young of his own species.8 We would further add to Strauss’s ethics of 
literature and the usefulness of esotericism against conformism its necessity in 
                                                 
7 See Soleràs’ comment in the Joan Sales novel Incerta glòria: “la serenitat dels classics 
consisteix en no llegir-los” (the serenity of the classics consists of not reading them). 
8 Altini (1998:227), paraphrasing Strauss. To study Strauss today, not only is the essay by Lastra 
cited necessary, so is the work by Altini (2000). 
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an order that seems increasingly more subjugated to the expression “politically 
correct”.9 
 
3. Communication and transmission: From Aristophanes to Plato. 
Analysis of Plato’s Symposium 
Strauss suggests that persecution fails wherever caution is the guiding principle 
in one’s mission as a dissident writer whose intelligence enables him to 
guarantee his personal safety without diminishing the efficacy of his 
undertaking. The effect of persecution forces writers to use a particular writing 
technique. Strauss illustrates this with an extreme example where persecution 
shows its most brutal face. It is easy to imagine, he says, a writer who, free from 
all suspicion and respected by the only political party existing in a totalitarian 
state, is guided by his studies to question the rectitude of the official 
interpretation of the history of religion. Surely no one would prevent him from 
publishing a virulent criticism of liberal opinion. To this end, he would have to 
first outline this opinion in order to later criticise it. In the course of his 
exposition, which is brimming with numerous literal citations and a host of 
technical terms, using the characteristic resources of official propaganda, he 
would confer unjustified importance on insignificant details, omitting some of 
the most important questions. And only when he has reached the core of his 
argumentation “would he write three or four sentences in this vivid, concise 
style susceptible to drawing the attention of the youth who love thinking” 
(Strauss, 1952:24). This central passage would outline the position of the 
adversaries more clearly, more irresistibly and more implacably than in the best 
times of liberalism, abandoning “all the absurd excrescences of the liberal credo 
which had the chance to proliferate in the heyday of liberalism, in the times 
therefore that were approaching stupidity”, in such a way that “his young and 
reasonable reader would have a fleeting vision of the forbidden fruit for the first 
time” (Strauss, 1952:25). The crux of the work, its critical part, would consist of 
                                                 
9 The book by Lastra (2000) reaches the core of Strauss’ philosophy. However, from Lucretius 
on, with Lessing as one of the cores of Strauss’ thinking according to A. Lastra, is it not difficult 
to explain Strauss’ mission to exert political influence – or was it merely political philosophy? 
And was Stanley Rosen right when he provocatively claimed that Strauss was even more radical 
than those who thought that philosophy was over, because he thought that philosophy had never 
existed? The light that Lastra sheds on Lucretius and Strauss has give us yet another clue for 
explaining a lack of Plato in Strauss: Strauss rarely cites the Letters. Strauss disdains the 
Academy. Yet again I am using a provocative formula: Strauss never understood Plato because 
he thought that Plato was ancient; yet Plato, and in this we are with Stanley Rosen, is modern, 
not ancient. What is the nature of human nature? Ultimately, Lastra’s study of Strauss leads us 
to this fundamental problem. Strauss argues that history does not necessarily have a direction or 
character. Human beings can never control their fate because the world is never totally 
intelligible or rational. There is always something that escapes human understanding. This 
limitation means that there can never be a perfect political order, the repository of the truth. 
Strauss claims that the preservation of humanity relies on recognition of the limited or 
determined nature of human life. He suggests that human beings do not remain human if they 
do not recognize the existence of something that is more than them – what has traditionally 
been called god or gods. As a philosopher, he leaves the question clearly posed. As an epicurean, 
suggests Lastra, gods are distant and have no relationship with human beings. As a Jew, Strauss 
resides in the mystery of the presence and absence of Yahweh. As a politician, suggests Rosen, 
Strausswould do with Plato but the same as Kojèvedid with Hegel (see Rosen [1987a], especially 
the third and central chapter which lends its name to the title of the book and which is devoted 
to his teachers Kojève and Strauss). 
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the deployment of the most virulent theses from the official books of the 
governing party. After his passionate and joyous reading of the brief central 
passages, the intelligent youth would find these pages particularly dense and 
distressing, thus discriminating the true meaning and scope of the expository 
part, especially after successive readings. The example seems forced, but recent 
history yields surprising examples: in the past decades we have witnessed the 
discovery of works that had remained closeted in the secret archives of the 
Soviet political police, along with works that were published in the purest 
reticent or esoteric style that we have discussed, such as the texts on the 
philosophy of language in Plato which are dealt with from the standpoint of 
orthodox theology (Maristany, 2002). Having all the advantages of 
communication, both public and private, but none of its disadvantages 
(personal safety is never seriously threatened), esoteric literature is targeted 
exclusively to intelligent, trustworthy readers: the circumstances require and 
determine their minority status. 
The term “persecution” encompasses a variety of phenomena, which 
range from the Inquisition to ostracism. Its multiform condition explains why 
examples can be found even in periods that can be considered relatively liberal, 
such as Athens in the 5th and 4th centuries BC, certain Muslim countries in the 
Middle Ages, Holland and England in the 17th century or France and Germany 
in the 18th century. Philosophers’ biographies illustrate how they have suffered 
from persecution at some point in their life. However, the nature of esoteric or 
reticent literature is determined not exclusively by persecution but also by the 
diversity of perspectives on the limits of popular education that characterise the 
ancient and modern philosophers. Thus, starting in the mid-17th century, a 
certain number of heterodox philosophers who had suffered from persecution 
published their books not only to communicate their thinking but also because 
they thought they were contributing to the abolition of persecution:  
 
“They assumed that the suppression of freedom of thought and 
the publication of the results of free thinking were accidental, an 
excrescence from the mistaken construction of the state, and that the 
realm of general darkness would be replaced by the republic of 
universal light” (Strauss, 1952:33).  
 
They thought that there would be a time when practically total freedom 
of speech would be possible thanks to popular education. The attitude of the 
pre-modern philosophers was fundamentally different. They believe that a 
profound abyss separates the sages from the vulgar folk. Philosophy or science 
was an affair of the few, this would not be changed by any progress in education, 
and furthermore, philosophy was suspicious and odious to the majority of 
people. Therefore, their opinions needed to be concealed from the non-
philosophers and limited to the oral instruction of a group of disciples or 
writings about the most important matters with only brief indications.10 Their 
writings, therefore, are generally more esoteric, and thus what predominates in 
                                                 
10 See Strauss (1952:34). Strauss was thinking about Cicero: Tusculanae Disputationes, II, 4, 
and especially about Plato: Phaedrus, 64b; Republic, 520b2-3 and 494a1-10;Timaeus, 28c3-5; 
Letter VII, 332d6-7, 341c4-e3, 344d4-e2. See Strauss (1946:326-367). 
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them are the most convenient opinions held by the vulgar folk, while they 
surreptitiously reveal indications on the philosopher’s true opinion on the 
crucial questions. These books, therefore, contain two lessons, one exoteric, 
popular and edifying, and the other esoteric, philosophical, between the lines, 
targeted not so much at the philosophers as to “those youth who love the truth” 
or those intelligent enough to become the chosen few who know the truth of 
things. These youngsters must be led step by step from the popular opinions, 
which are practically and politically expedient, towards the pure and simple 
theoretical truth. The esoteric texts are “written speeches caused by love” 
(Strauss, 1952:36). 
Let us close with another story, this one true. It is a story about the limits 
of communication and politics. One of the culminating moments in the 
Peloponnesian War was Athens’ expedition to Sicily, an impressive military 
enterprise which could have marked a pivotal point in the war. Democratic 
Athens decided to embark upon the expedition, investing its utmost in terms of 
money, supplies and men. The excitement over the expedition was at its peak 
when an irreverent deed, which at first seemed irrelevant, put the entire venture 
in jeopardy. It happened that the majority of stone Hermes sculptures which 
peppered the city of Athens –blocks with a quadrangular structure showing 
figures of the god; custom dictated that many of them be built in the city – 
appeared decapitated one night. No one knew who had done it, but the deed 
struck the superstitious souls of the Athenians and they promised a generous 
reward for whoever would reveal the masterminds. They furthermore handed 
down a decree which stated that if anyone knew of another act of impiety, he 
should openly denounce it under the guarantee of impunity, regardless of 
whether he was a citizen, outsider or slave. Thucydides, whom we are following 
in this story, added that the utmost importance was attached to this affair 
because it was interpreted as an omen for the expedition and at the same time 
as a revolutionary plot with the purpose of overthrowing democracy. The 
occasion was seized upon by foreigners and slaves to denounce the fact that 
there had been other mutilations of divine statues performed by certain young 
men on drunken sprees, as well as parodies of mysterious celebrations held in 
private homes. These accusations also involved Alcibiades, who was supposed to 
lead the military expedition. His enemies wished him ill, but they avoided 
judgement until the expedition had departed. They wanted his friends gone, and 
thus they started the summary judgements with capital punishments after the 
expedition had already left. They commanded that Alcibiades return to Athens, 
leaving the expedition. The fact that Alcibiades ended up going to the enemy 
side and that the expedition ended up failing resulted precisely from this lack of 
unity.11 
Hermes was the son of Zeus and Maia, born in Arcadia. He was the 
messenger of the gods, a kind of herald who oversaw peace and war, the battles 
and loves of the gods, the internal system of Olympus and the link between the 
world and Heaven, land and Hell. He was charged with carrying the souls of the 
dead to Hell; he was the god who presided over games and assemblies, the god 
of eloquence and rhetoric and of all messengers, merchants and 
communicators, always alert and always vigilant. Among the many inventions 
and stories attributed to him (precise language, writing, wrestling, dancing, the 
                                                 
11 Thucydides: The History of the Peloponnesian War, VI, 27, 28, 53, 60. See Strauss (1964). 
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lyre, etc.), he was the most famous for decapitating Argos, who was watching 
over one of Zeus’ lovers on assignment by his jealous wife. In the city, stone 
statues of Hermes were placed at intersections as the patron god of 
communication. The attack against the stone Hermes, their decapitation or 
castration, was readily interpreted as an attack against the city’s most intimate 
ties, and as such, the ties that united the city into an integrated unit with the 
word, which made everyday life possible. It was also an attack against 
democracy, because this communication was open to all citizens and even 
outsiders in the guise of trade and exchange. Attacking Hermes meant attacking 
communication; it meant placing limits on it. 
Leo Strauss suggests that Plato’s Symposium took place precisely that 
night. Towards the end of the symposium, which had transpired so far without 
drink extraordinarily – because they were still hung over from drink the 
previous night – and without a flautist – so they could talk like educated people 
– after the succession of laudatory speeches of the new deity, Eros, and after 
Alcibiades’ speech praising Socrates, who had interrupted the symposium by 
arriving totally drunk and occupying the stage and taking the floor, the order 
was definitively lost:  
 
“Then Agathon got up to sit next to Socrates, but suddenly a 
throng of people in the midst of a binge showed up at the door of the 
house, and since they found it open because someone was leaving, they 
directly entered where we were and laid down on the beds. A huge 
uproar ensued, the order that had been now vanished, and people were 
forced to drink wine abundantly” (Plato: Symposium, 223b).  
 
After the upheaval, the symposium resumed. Eryximachus, Phaedrus and 
several others got up and left. Eryximachus and Phaedrus, temperate and 
notorious abstainers, were accused of mutiliating the Hermes along with 
Alcibiades and his friends, notorious drunks and pranksters. Plato does not say 
this, but all these names were known by his readers as having been accused of 
violating the Eleusinian mysteries and mutilating the Hermes statues.12 What 
was discussed that night at the party at Agathon’s house? 
The symposium was a celebration of the award that the playwright 
Agathon had received. According to Phaedrus’ opinion, they had decided to 
celebrate it with a series of speeches in praise of a new deity, Eros, which joined 
gods and men together with new bonds, instead of speeches in praise of 
Aphrodite, which would have been more common. The dinner was tinged with a 
clearly erotic, political charge with the praise of the god that is human-deity 
more than the traditional gods. Among the participants were recognised lovers, 
and their praise of Eros was very circumscribed to their private relations. What 
is more, all the speakers in the Symposium, with the exception of 
Aristophanes,13were presented in the Protagoras as disciples of their masters.14 
                                                 
12 This was Leo Strauss’ opinion according to Rosen (1987b:285). 
13 Aristophanes took an increasingly prominent role in the economy of the dialogue. Plato treats 
him with special deference and introduces him as one of those elements that ultimately brings 
something to the final resolution of the dialogue, when Aristophanes and Agathon fall asleep 
while listening to Socrates. The fact that one of Aristophanes’ early texts, which has not 
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The Symposium ended up being the second part of the Protagoras, where we 
are shown the result of the different sophisticated educations in wealthy Athens: 
transmission and communication have ended up a notorious failure at a peak in 
the city’s greatest success, which precedes its greatest failure, the defeat to 
Sparta and the civil war. To Jordi Sales, the accomplishment of Platonic 
teaching is that is shows us where philosophical effort as a possible symposium 
lies, that is, dealing with it with more or less “hardened” spirits and the difficult 
knowledge of its possible “flexibilities” or rejuvenations.  
 
“For this reason, it is primarily known as a difficult opportunity 
of lost occasions of the previous symposiums as preparations for flawed 
destructions or transmissions. Avoidable destructions? Improvable or 
correctible transmissions? From where? Perhaps from a game, one that 
is even more difficult than the previous ones, between the Academy as 
an institution and dialogue as tragic-comic-philosophical writing.” 
(Sales, 1996:13) 
 
Let us conclude: It is often forgotten that without politics the conditions 
for communication cannot arise, that without communication there is no 
possibility of a real politics, that the limits that allow communication are 
political: the city wall is the protected area where Hermes could find a place. 
However, attacking Hermes, or attacking communication, is tantamount 
toslaying the city from the inside. It is often forgotten that those who attack the 
Hermes can be individuals or the state itself, and in both cases it is a process of 
self-destruction. It is often forgotten that the city must exist in order to 
guarantee the possibility of a rudimentary elementary communication, that of 
the common citizen, the kind that can only guarantee the kind of education that 
gives meaning to the universal right to vote. Nor should we forget the ever-
present possibility of losing the conditions that make freedom of expression 
possible. The fact that the conservatives frame the battle for education and the 
university in these terms should lead us to think about how we can change the 
argumentative disguises. “Education is the only answer to the always disturbing 
question, to the political question par excellence, of how to reconcile an order 
that is not oppression with a freedom that is not license” (Strauss, 1952:37), that 
we think about the possibility of an education that situates us with respect to the 
definition of the contemporary political enterprise. 
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